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The Canadian Attack at 
Amiens, 8-11 August 1918 
Dean Chappelle 
B y mid-1918, the character of the First World War had changed completely from 
the relatively static previous three years of 
battle. In March, the Germans had launched 
their desperate gamble to win the war in a 
single massive offensive and had been halted, 
atgreatcosttobothsides, byJune. On 18July 
the French, aided by American forces, launched 
their highly successful counter-attack at 
Soissons and demonstrated that the German 
forces were far weaker than the previous year. 
The opportunity was ripe to strike quickly and 
in force. This occurred at 4:20a.m. on the 8th 
of August when the Battle of Arniens opened 
with the resounding crash of the combined 
artillery of two armies. One of the most powerful 
Allied forces ever assembled during the Great 
War, consisting of the French First (Debeney) 
and British Fourth (Rawlinson) Armies 
strengthened by the Canadian Corps and the 
entire British Cavalry and Tank Corps, rushed 
forward and fell upon the first line of generally 
ill-prepared and heavily outmatched Germans 
just east of the important railway centre at 
Ami ens. 
The attack, at least from a tactical/ 
operational point of view, was a complete 
surprise. 1 By the end of the day, the Allies had 
achieved their greatest victory of the War, 
driving the Germans back as far as the old 
1916lines. The Canadian Corps, forming the 
Fourth Army's right flank, had taken their 
"final" objective (designated by a blue dotted 
line), save for the village of Le Quesnel and its 
surrounding area on the extreme right flank, 
and advanced to a maximum depth of eight 
miles. On their left, the Australians had done 
equally well, taking all of their objectives for a 
maximum advance of seven miles. The French, 
on the Canadian right, had also conducted 
themselves admirably, advancing five miles. 
"My chief anxiety [is the 
Canadians] as they have the 
most difficult job." 
General Rawlinson, 
diary entry on 5 August 1918. 
The most disappointing advance was in the 
extreme north, where the British Third Corps 
had managed only a maximum penetration of 
two miles, due largely to heavy German attacks 
on their front during the previous three days. 
Casualties, considering the ground gained, 
were extremely light. The Canadians suffered 
3, 868 ( 1 , 036 killed) and the Fourth Army as a 
whole a comparatively "mere" 8,800, excluding 
tank and air losses. The Germans gave their 
casualties as 650-700 officers and 26-27,000 
other ranks. Most of these losses represented 
prisoners, as the Canadians alone took 5,033 
for the day. 2 
Mter the very successful first day, the 
battle continued until 11 August when, for all 
intents and purposes, it died down, and the 
offensive was officially called to a halt on 18 
August to allow time to bring up fresh reserves. 
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The attack on 9 August saw further successes, 
with a maximum gain of four miles on the 
Canadian front. Following this, however, 
resistance quickly stiffened due to the increased 
number of German reserves, and the obvious 
exhaustion of the attacking troops. The Allied 
line had been pushed forward to a few miles 
short of Roye, but remained far short of Ham, 
the "final objective" outlined by Haig on 5 
August (see below). Total British casualties 
were 22,202, while the French suffered 24,232. 
As with most German figures by 1918, an 
accurate assessment of their casualties is 
problematic, but they were estimated at 75,000, 
over half of these prisoners. The British and 
French captured some 500 enemy guns, in 
addition to large numbers of machine guns, 
mortars, vehicles, and other equipment. 3 
The operation, originally foreseen as merely 
an attack to free the Paris-Amiens railway from 
German long-range guns, was first discussed 
by Foch and Haig on 17 May 1918. It was then 
to involve Rawlinson's Fourth Army, Debeney's 
First French Army and some 200 tanks. It was, 
however, only one of several options considered 
at the time and no details were then put forth. 
It was not until 13 July that Rawlinson was 
given specific orders by GHQ to draft his plans 
for an attack east of Amiens. The "fox" (as 
Rawlinson had long been known) had in fact 
been contemplating such an attack since the 
small scale attack at Hamel on 4 July, involving 
the Fourth Australian Division, a battalion of 
the 33rd American Division, and 60 of the new 
Mark V tanks of the 5th Tank Brigade. The 
inclusion of the latter was quite significant as 
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A Mark V tank advances down the Amiens-Roye road and passes German prisoners being sent to the rear. 
(NAC PA 2946) 
this was the first battle test of the new model, 
much improved from its predecessor. The tank 
attack was a great success, taking all of its 
limited aims and managing to get all but three 
of the Mk Vs to their final objectives, with only 
one of these lost due to enemy fire. 4 
The Hamel operation convinced Rawlinson 
of the usefulness ofthe new machines and they 
figured prominently in his 17 July outline for 
the Arniens operation, as did the Australian 
Corps. In addition to his present forces (the 
whole of the Tank and Australian Corps), he 
requested his Fourth Army be reinforced with 
the Canadian Corps, which was to play an 
important role in the attack. Originally, the 
Australian Corps was to spearhead the main 
thrust of the operation, but as the plan 
progressed, the Canadians became equally 
important and some would say most important 
to the operation, as they not only had the most 
difficult terrain in front of them, the swampy 
and hilly Luce River Valley, but also formed the 
important link with the French First Army on 
the Corps' right, a source of potential difficulty 
in co-ordination. 5 
The objectives of the operation were 
problematic almost from the beginning, due 
largely to the fact that Fourth Army and GHQ 
had differing conceptions about how the attack 
should progress. Rawlinson and his staff, who 
preferred strictly limited attacks, at least in 
terms of distance, doubted that all of the 
Ami ens outer defences could be reached on the 
first day, particularly on the Canadian front 
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where they were as much as 14,000 yards from 
the jumping-off line and the terrain was so 
difficult. This line was thus designated by a 
dotted blue line on the Corps' front denoting, 
undoubtedly, an objective of opportunity only, 
as Fourth Army planners considered it 
"unlikely" that the Canadians would reach this 
point by the end of the first day. 6 This strongly 
differed with GHQ's and particularly Haig's 
conception of the attack. On 5 August, Haig 
greatly complicated matters by insisting that 
Fourth Army's plans be amended to push the 
attack, ". . . in the general direction . . . [of] 
Ham," several miles beyond the outer Ami ens 
defences (not on this map, but several miles 
east of Roye). noting that the Fourth Army 
plans were too limited in scope. 7 Thus there 
was some confusion over just what the 
objectives ofthe operation were to be, reflected 
clearly in the immediate pre-battle orders at 
every level. This situation was, in fact, very 
similar to that which existed prior to the Somme 
attack in 1916, where few were sure of exact 
objectives, and where Rawlinson favoured more 
limited objectives than the more ambitious 
ones put forth by Haig. Fortunately, weapons, 
training, and tactical and operational command 
had generally improved in the British 
Expeditionary Force (BEF) by 1918 but, as 
evidenced by this situation, strategic command 
still possessed many of the old problems. 
Despite such discrepancies in planning, 8 
August was the most singularly successful 
Allied day of the First World War. In the British 
case it was seen as the supreme example of 
how Great War battles could and should have 
been conducted. Glowing narratives of the 
operation are included in most histories of the 
War, particularly those of the Canadian and 
Australian forces. However, it was not the 
"sand table" exercise presented by most 
historians and many aspects of the battle did 
not go according to plan. Although it is of 
course true that very few battles come off 
exactly as conceived, nearly all histories have 
ignored the failings and problems of the Ami ens 
operation, particularly in the Canadian case. 
In the end, the Canadian Corps had improved 
significantly, even from its impressive attack 
at Vimy Ridge sixteen months before, but still 
retained several imperfections and 
inconsistencies. The Corps was, in essence, a 
92 
near-perfected "traditional" force which had 
developed extremely effective methods of 
coordinating infantry-artillery attacks but was 
largely unable to add the third piece of the 
puzzle, tanks, due largely to inexperience and 
lack of training with the machines.8 Most of 
these difficulties were representative of those 
which existed in the BEF at the time. As is 
often the case with the Great War, some 
contextualization of the events is necessary. 
Essentially, the first two phases of the 
Canadian attack were relatively easy, mostly 
due to the close support provided by the 
artillery. It was in the third phase, the advance 
and consolidation of the so-called blue dotted 
line, that most of the difficulties surfaced. As 
one report put it, "Beyond the Red line, the 
aspect of the battle changed altogether."9 The 
problem most evident was the relative lack of 
tank-infantry cooperation. As Fourth Army 
and Tank Corps planners had feared before the 
battle, the Canadians' lack of experience with 
the machines resulted in a general 
misunderstanding of their use. There were two 
basic difficulties in this respect. The first, and 
most apparent, was a marked over-dependence 
on the machines by the infantry. A typical 
report commented that: 
Considering the ragged state of the defence [past the 
red line] our advance was not rapid enough. Too 
often, rather than manoeuvre out of a position held 
by a few machine gunners. our troops waited for 
tanks. 10 
A similar commentary pointed out the tendency 
of the infantry to halt if the tank attacking with 
them was knocked out. 11 That is not to say that 
this was universally the case, but this was 
certainly a relatively common problem, as the 
frequency of its mention attests. There was 
also a failure, in many cases, of the infantry to 
protect the flanks of the machines from anti-
tank fire. The Mk V tank, although by far the 
most able heavy tank of the Great War, was still 
relatively "blind" and required infantry to 
constantly seek out and destroy guns which, if 
left to fire over open sights, could be extremely 
effective versus armour. As one battle summary 
noted, "Infantry must always remember that 
they can assist tanks to get their objective. "12 
There seemed to be a slight degree of resentment 
on both sides that the other arm was acting on 
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A 60-pounder in action at Amiens. (NAC PA 2999) 
its own and not coordinating its efforts. A post-
battle meeting at Canadian Corps HQ, for 
example, noted that although theinfantrymust 
remember to carry out their duty of 
reconnaissance for the machines: "There has 
been a tendency on the part of the tanks to act 
as an arm independent of the other arms, and 
to forget that their action must be auxiliary to 
that of the infantry." 13 
The major causes of the Canadians' 
difficulty in integrating armour into their system 
were simple lack of experience and training 
with the new weapon. They had no battle 
experience whatsoever with the new Mark V 
tank, which again had been introduced into 
combat only one month before at Hamel, and in 
previous battles had only worked with (and in 
most cases little more than seen) earlier models 
in very small numbers. They did undergo some 
training with tanks during May and June of 
1918, but due to the very intensive nature of 
these exercises, armour was given only a 
cursory role, and it is not clear that they even 
trained with the Mk V, probably not surprising 
considering the then "secret" nature of the as 
yet untried machine. In the one or two exercises 
involving tanks, the other arms seemed 
confused as to how to integrate the machines 
into their already highly developed methods. 
As William Rawling pointed out, in these 
exercises the Canadians basically, " ... learned 
enough not to get run over by the beasts." 14 
Both Fourth Army and the Tank Corps realised 
this problem before the battle and urged that 
steps be taken to correct this deficiency as 
soon as possible. 15 Due to constraints of time, 
however, there was little opportunity to improve 
this situation before 8 August. Thus, as 
previously noted, the Canadian Corps remained 
an essentially "traditional" (i.e. non-
mechanized) force, albeit a very effective one. 
One solution which may have avoided some 
ofthese problems, as suggested by many ofthe 
reports, was unified command. AtArniens, the 
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tanks were not directly under the orders of the 
formation with which they attacked, but instead 
acted on their own. In short, the tanks and the 
infantry conducted two separate attacks aimed 
at the same objectives. This problem could 
have been solved, noted the post-battle 
assessments, if the tanks allotted to an infantry 
formation came directly under that formation's 
orders, as was the case for artillery. 16 Although 
this may seem an obvious step, it did not seem 
to have occurred to the planners before Ami ens, 
perhaps due to the resistance to such an idea 
by the Tank Corps, or to mere oversight. 
"I do not know how long Haig 
thought it would take us to reach 
[the outer Amiens defences], but I do 
know that neither he nor anyone else 
expected us to reach it as we did by 
the night of August 8th." 
General Sir Arthur Currie, 
from H.M. Urquart. Arthur Currie. 
As the Canadian attack showed, there were 
several other armour-related problems, 
conceming the design and use of the machines 
themselves. The first concerned the use of the 
old Mk IV type machines as supply tanks. They 
simply could not keep up to the rapid advance 
of the infantry and Mk Vs. 17 The transportation 
of vital supplies, particularly fuel and 
ammunition for the tanks, to the forward 
positions was often delayed at crucial points, 
because the heavily burdened Mk IVs could 
only manage about 1 mph over the rough 
ground of the Luce River Valley. One engineer's 
report characterized the supply tanks as, 
"completely useless. "18 
The most severe difficulty in the area of 
armoured design at Amiens was the complete 
failure of the Mk V* troop carrying tank. The 
concept of the machine was a good one on 
paper: assault troops were carried in the tanks 
to assist in taking the final objective, and thus 
spared the exhaustion and hazards of marching 
up on foot. It was, of course, a concept applied 
successfully in the Second War and ever since. 
94 
Unfortunately, the Mk V* was far from an ideal 
vehicle for this use. The design was a lengthened 
Mk V, intended to carry up to twenty troops, in 
addition to its crew of eight. The problem was 
that the Mk Vs were very poorly ventilated. 
Tank crews became somewhat accustomed to 
the heat and fumes, although as will be seen, 
even they had difficulty with prolonged 
exposure. For an infantryman who had never 
been in a tank in his life, to be put into a hot 
and suffocating metal box for several hours 
was more than most could handle. By the time 
the tank-borne infantry reached their 
objectives, they were oflittle fighting value, as 
most became sick with the heat and fumes. In 
fact, many had to be removed before the final 
objective was reached, to march alongside the 
machine. 19 One Canadian infantryman 
described his journey in a Mk V* as, " ... a sort 
of pocket hell. "20 The Mk V* battalion attacking 
with the Australians had similar experiences. 
The unfortunate aspect, at least as far as 
future development of armoured infantry 
carriers, was the conclusion about the 
experiment, as one report advanced: "It is 
considered that tanks should not in [the) future 
be employed in this way."21 In hindsight, it is 
unfortunate that the Mk V* was not employed 
as a supply tank at Ami ens as it was well suited 
for such a use, much more so than the refitted 
Mk IVs used for this purpose. 
Even the regular crews of the Mk V s 
experienced difficulties with prolonged 
exposure to the machine's heat and fumes. 
They were no doubt more resistant than the 
infantry, but they too could only bear the 
hardships for so long. This was a problem 
which could have been lessened and perhaps 
eliminated all together by the simple provision 
of replacement crews, a lesson which came out 
of the Cambrai operation. Several reports 
pointed out the discernible decrease in the 
efficiency of the crews after even one full day of 
combat in the tanks, ". . . no crew can be 
expected to go into action and do itself justice 
for more than two days running. "22 Thus, the 
large number of tank casualties on the second 
and third days could perhaps have been 
reduced, if on the night of 8 August, fresh 
crews had been rushed up to replace the 
exhausted men who had spent twelve plus 
hours in the unpleasant machines. 23 
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The final difficulty with armour at Amiens 
concemed the Whippet or Medium "A" tank, a 
new weapon which first saw action on the 8th. 
These new "medium" tanks, based on similar 
French designs, were faster than their heavier 
predecessors, armed only with machine guns, 
and designed to attack with the cavalry. The 
marriage of armour and cavalry, however, was 
not a happy one. The Whippets could not keep 
up to the cavalry and even if they did, the 
cavalry could not aid the machines against the 
enemy's main defence -well placed machine 
gun nests. A better use for the Whippets, as 
suggested by some post battle reports, would 
have been to employ them with the Mk Vs and 
infantry. One suggested the following, " ... to 
break through as far as possible with the heavy 
tanks and to follow them up with the Whippets 
and armoured cars, so as to keep the enemy on 
the move."24 Although this was a step in the 
right direction, it is odd that none ofthe reports 
suggested a use for the machines which would 
seem natural - to protect the flanks of the 
heavy tanks using their superior mobility. To 
be fair, this was the first battle test of the 
Whippet and most observers remained 
enthusiastic about its future use, but it was 
obvious to all that the employment of the 
weapon with cavalry was a waste. 
The cavalry operation which was launched 
with the Whippets was the last large scale 
employment of this former "arme blanche" in 
British history. Such an action was not only 
outdated, it actually impeded operations. The 
cavalry did get to a lot of its objectives on the 
blue dotted line, but was unable to hold them 
without the infantry and tanks. It also appears 
that the cavalry was largely responsible for the 
failure to take Le Quesnel, the only part of the 
dotted blue line not taken on 8 August, as this 
was a primary objective on their front. The 
cavalry was ordered, once the infantry had 
reached the blue dotted line, to push 
A Mark V tank passing the 8th Field Ambulance at Hangard, France. 
(NAC PA 2888) 
95 
7
Chappelle: The Canadian Attack at Amiens, 8–11 August 1918
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 1993
immediately on to Roye, but were unable to 
advance much past their positions on that line, 
and completely unable to hold any position 
past that point. 25 One of the major problems 
was that the cavalry were very ineffective against 
MGs and groups of enemy who had taken up 
positions in wooded areas. The enemy positions 
on the blue dotted line, and particularly past 
problem arose when telephone wires, laid by 
engineering and signal troops following the 
infantry, were destroyed by the cavalry moving 
up to the attack, which disrupted the already 
problematic communications. 27 
Despite all of these difficulties Ami ens was 
the most successful Allied operation of the 
A Canadian-commanded tank having its war crest painted on before the Battle of Amiens. 
this point, consisted largely of such defences. 
In such terrain the cavalry were also a detriment 
to operations, due to the poor visibility. As one 
report noted, " ... we could have dealt with 
certain situations with artillery and trench 
mortar fire, but were in doubt to the location of 
the cavalry. Their charges at many times ... 
were exceedingly gallant, butfutile."26 Another 
96 
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Great War, and as the Canadians penetrated 
furthest in that operation, some aspects of the 
attack must have worked well. Foremost among 
these was the artillery. The quick and relatively 
easy capture of the green and red lines was 
largely facilitated by the effectiveness of gunnery 
in the BEFby 1918. The initial barrage, which 
covered the advance to the green line, was 
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especially devastating to the enemy defences. 
Most impressive was the counter-battery work 
performed by the Corps' gunners, under the 
able guidance of Andrew McNaughton, which 
silenced the enemy batteries quickly and 
without which the attack would have ground 
rapidly to a halt: "The enemy barrage at the 
opening ofthe attack was fairly heavy, but was 
quickly smothered by our [counterbattery] work 
and [soon] the enemy shelling decreased almost 
to zero."28 The work of the artillery was even 
more impressive when it is remembered that 
they had less than a week to prepare for the 
attack, due to the highly rapid and secretive 
nature of the operation. The only real problems 
experienced by the artillery on 8 August 
occurred when the infantry had passed the red 
line and were out of the range of field artillery 
and out of the effective range of the heavy 
artillery. Thus the guns, particularly the field 
artillery, had to be rushed forward. Due to the 
novelty of semi-open warfare, a faster advance 
than anticipated, and the aforementioned 
problems in communication, the guns had 
great difficulty in keeping pace. One account 
noted that the guns were usually only able to 
offer support past the red line where the advance 
was temporarily checked, allowing a lag time 
for the field pieces to catch up. This problem 
aside, the artillery was unquestionably the 
most effective weapon on the Corps' front. 
Provisions had also been made for the 
employment of captured guns, and 26 ofthese 
were put into action on 8 August by specially 
trained gunners, who fired over 1, 500 rounds 
from them at the retreating enemy. This was 
an idea toyed with in the past, but first used 
with great success at Amiens. 29 By this time 
artillery was the "arme blanche" of the Corps 
and of the BEF in general, due largely to the 
experience of the previous two years and the 
fact that the Canadian Corps was the only 
permanent corps in the BEF, giving the gunners 
and infantry ample time to develop a good 
working relationship. 30 Even the Fourth Army 
recognized this fact, and noted, ". . . the 
Top: German prisoners wearing gas masks march to 
rear carrying wounded while British tanks 
advance to theJrunt. (NAC PA 2951) 
Bottom: Canadians wearing gas masks bring in a 
wounded comrade. (NAC PA 2863) 
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advantages of the permanent Corps system . . . 
(resulted] in a clearly defined artillery policy 
and plan of action in the Corps. "31 
Another formation of the Corps was also 
instrumental in aiding the advance, particularly 
in the early phases -the engineers. These 
troops played their most vital role on the 3rd 
Division's front, where the Luce flowed most 
heavily across the Canadian area of attack. At 
one point the river and accompanying wet 
marshy ground was more than 200 yards wide. 
The attacking troops held off the enemy while 
the engineers constructed footbridges across 
the river for the infantry. In several other areas 
where the Luce cut the front the engineers 
proved to be of equal value and thus made the 
crossing of this very difficult obstacle look 
relatively easy. 32 
A Canadian armoured car, part of the Canadian 
Independent Force, going into action at Amiens. 
(NAC PA 3015) 
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On the Corps right flank, the big success 
story concerned the Canadian Independent 
Force, commanded by the able and innovative 
Raymond Brutinel. This was the first battle in 
which the CIF fought in its entirety and it 
certainly proved itself. This force, composed 
largely of machine guns mounted on armoured 
cars as well as signal and cyclist units, had the 
difficult task of coordinating its actions with 
the attacking infantry, tanks and cavalry, while 
securing the Amiens-Roye road and 
maintaining contact with the French, to ensure 
that the Canadian and French attacks did not 
diverge. In addition to this, the CIF acted as a 
reconnaissance unit, and in doing so harassed 
the enemy, particularly past the blue dotted 
line. The force's mobility was certainly a great 
factor in its success. It penetrated some 
distance past the blue dotted line and thus 
played a valuable role in reconnaissance. Unlike 
the infantry, a post-battle report of the CIF 
noted that: "The training and lessons learnt on 
recent open warfare manoeuvres were of the 
greatest value, as all ranks understood the role 
they had to play. "33 Among the most successful 
weapons of the force was the employment of 6" 
Newton mortars mounted on armoured cars. 
These were essentially an early version of a 
self-propelled gun and acted as an independent 
unit. They engaged several enemy batteries 
with a good deal of success, and provided the 
CIFwith responsive, indirect fire support. Even 
Fourth Army HQ realized the value of this 
experimental weapon and recommended a great 
increase in their use. Finally, the CIF also 
aided the French on several occasions, 
especially in outflanking strong points, as well 
as sending back many useful reports from its 
main task of reconnaissance.34 That is not to 
suggest that the force did not encounter 
problems, as it would have been extremely odd 
if a new formation of such an experimental 
nature did not encounter difficulties in its first 
attack. There was some lack of co-ordination 
between the armoured cars and problems in 
using these vehicles for frontal attacks. The 
latter difficulty was no doubt caused by a 
desire to keep the vehicles on the road, as they 
were ill-equipped for off-road use. They were 
also relatively vulnerable to enemy gun fire, 
due to their high profile, which had to be 
compensated for with speed.35 
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Germans captured by the Canadians at Amiens. The capture of so many prisoners was unprecedented on the 
Western Front. (NAC PA 2858) 
The Canadian Corps possessed infantry of 
a very high calibre, and although there remained 
problems in integrating new methods into the 
existing system, Canadian infantrymen stood 
up to their reputation atAmiens, demonstrating 
a great deal ofbravery and skill, as the advance 
and the four Victoria Crosses awarded to their 
ranks on 8 August attest. 36 The large number 
of prisoners and guns captured for the day also 
attested to the infantry's skill, as tanks, cavalry 
and artillery units were not tasked or equipped 
for the capture and holding of prisoners. The 
advance, in all phases, depended on an infantry 
willing to push on often under very difficult 
circumstances. The troops were certainly given 
extra drive by their great advance, as several 
first hand accounts spoke of the elation felt by 
all at such an advance after so many years of 
static warfare. 37 The valour of the infantry was 
especially evident in the advance from the red 
to blue dotted lines, where they played a vital 
role in securing the latter objective, when 
planners believed that they would be unable to 
be of much use in capturing such a distant and 
well defended objective on the first day. Doyle 
put it best when he noted that: "The Canadians 
were on top of their form that day, and their 
magnificent condition gave promise of the 
splendid work which they were to do from that 
hour until almost the last day of the war."38 
The Mk V tanks working with the Canadian 
Corps also performed generally quite well, 
despite the aforementioned problems. The 
Germans captured in the battle were much 
impressed by the new machine and realised 
that it constituted a great improvement over 
past models. The machines played an important 
role, particularly in the advance from red to 
blue dotted lines where they were useful in 
attacking enemy MG nests. There are problems 
with suggesting that the machines played the 
decisive role in the victory of 8 August, as some 
authors have done. While this holds some 
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truth as far as the attack on the Australian 
front, as demonstrated here they were far from 
the decisive element on the Canadian. 
It should not seem surprising that some 
Canadian historians, such as Dancocks and 
Nicholson, have seen Amiens as a whole as a 
victory of artillery and infantry, while viewing 
tanks as minimal factors in the success. These 
authors, examining the Canadian attack only 
and depending almost exclusively on Canadian 
sources, have drawn the right conclusion as 
far as the Canadian attack was concerned. The 
problem, of course, arises when the whole 
battle is characterized in this manner. But the 
problem with Dancocks' conclusion that the 
conception of Amiens as a great tank victory is 
a myth, and Nicholson's similar comments, are 
that tanks played a very effective role in the 
Australian attack. 39 Conversely, Tim Travers 
has suggested that the tanks played a great 
role in the victory at Amiens, and uses 
Australian accounts to prove his point. 40 Both 
assessments are correct, depending on which 
sector is examined in the most detail. The 
battle was thus neither a complete break from 
previous attacks, nor the logical conclusion of 
earlier operations, but rather a somewhat 
confused mix of the two, which reflected the 
somewhat haphazard "trial and error" manner 
in which the BEF developed during the Great 
War. 41 
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